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he National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) 
dominates contemporary regulation of intercollegiate 
sports, making it virtually impossible for colleges and 
universities to engage in high quality interscholastic competition 
without complying with the myriad requirements it promulgates.  
Some view the NCAA as a protector of all that is pure and 
decent in the world of college sports.  Others, perhaps more 
realistically, characterize the organization as a facilitator of 
anticompetitive practices among its constituent institutions.  
Conventional judicial wisdom suggests that NCAA regulations 
fall into two general categories:  (1) rules designed to promote 
and preserve the eligibility and amateur status of student-
athletes; and (2) other forms of regulation with a more economic 
purpose.1 
This dichotomous approach to the NCAA’s oversight role has 
been noted by federal courts in numerous antitrust suits 
challenging various aspects of NCAA rulemaking.2  Courts tend 
to routinely validate restrictions allegedly designed to promote 
the goal of amateurism, while other NCAA rules and regulations 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Leonard Cohen Chair in Law and Economics, Director, 
Loyola Sports Law Institute, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
1 See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (noting the NCAA 
engages in “two distinct kinds of rulemaking activity”–one rooted in concern for 
amateurism and the other “increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic 
purpose”). 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 37–115. 
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are subject to closer judicial scrutiny.  Some, however, perceive 
this two-pronged analytical model as flawed and anachronistic.3  
In any event, the NCAA continues to be the target of a 
relatively steady stream of antitrust challenges to its regulatory 
authority, and the line of demarcation between the two methods 
of analysis has become increasingly blurred. 
This Article begins with a brief description of the 
development of the NCAA and its emergence as the preeminent 
regulator of intercollegiate athletics.  Part II discusses the 
antitrust litigation challenging various NCAA rules and 
regulations and the creation of a dichotomous antitrust analysis 
that separates restraints on athletes from other commercial trade 
restrictions in the context of amateur sports.  Part III then 
deconstructs and criticizes this bifurcated approach, arguing that 
the conventional analysis is flawed and archaic given the 
economic realities of contemporary NCAA competition.  Part 
IV offers some alternative approaches to the issues, including a 
somewhat different application of antitrust principles as well as 
possible legislative considerations. 
I 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND GROWTH OF THE NCAA 
A.  Formation and the Early Years 
In early December 1905, the Chancellor of New York 
University convened a meeting of thirteen institutions to discuss 
reformation of college football playing rules in response to the 
growing number of serious injuries and deaths in the sport.4  On 
December 28, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the 
United States (“IAAUS”) was founded with sixty-two 
 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 116–26. 
4 The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2007).  The meetings resulted from the urging of President Theodore 
Roosevelt, who encouraged reform rather than abolition of intercollegiate football.  
See id.  From this seemingly narrow, well-intentioned effort to combat unnecessary 
physical injury in football, the NCAA’s role grew dramatically after World War II.  
See id.; see also ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III, BRIAN L. GOFF & ROBERT D. 
TOLLISON, THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION:  A STUDY IN 
CARTEL BEHAVIOR 39–40 (1992) (recognizing the need to address “brutal and 
violent techniques”); ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS 8 (1999) 
(noting that seven college football players died from game-related injuries in 1893, 
twelve in 1894, and eighteen in 1905, bringing the 1890–1905 total to 330). 
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members.5  The IAAUS “officially was constituted” on March 
31, 1906, and became the NCAA in 1910.6  Although football 
violence was the “catalyst” responsible for spawning the birth of 
the NCAA, “problems relating to amateurism and eligibility 
rules received as much, if not more, attention at the first NCAA 
Annual Meeting in 1906.”7  Commentators have explained that 
while the “original mission” of the NCAA “focused on providing 
public goods” by reducing violence and standardizing play, the 
NCAA “quickly turned its attention from standardizing rules to 
instituting the outlines of a cartel.”8 
From these rather modest beginnings, the NCAA steadily 
grew in stature and the scope and complexity of its rules and 
regulations expanded significantly as well.9  Fleisher, Goff, and 
Tollison characterize the period from 1905 through 1946 as a 
time of “early restraints,” when the NCAA adopted eligibility 
rules and output restrictions and engaged in other cartel-like 
activities.10  New eligibility requirements determined the 
allowable length of participation and required full-time student 
status, while other regulations pertained to amateur status and 
the “financial remuneration” of athletes.11  In 1916, the NCAA 
defined the “amateur athlete” as “one who participates in 
competitive physical sports only for the pleasure, and the 
 
5 The History of the NCAA, supra note 4. 
6 See id. 
7 ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE 33 
(1998).  Articles VI and VII of the NCAA’s 1906 by-laws reflected an “unequivocal, 
uncompromising” position on amateurism that was “virtually indistinguishable” 
from the British model at universities like Oxford and Cambridge.  Id.  More 
specifically, no scholarships or financial aid based on athletic rather than academic 
ability were permissible.  Id.  Prior to the formation of the NCAA, professionalism 
already had begun to creep into intercollegiate sports.  See ZIMBALIST, supra note 
4, at 6–7 (explaining that “[i]ntercollegiate sports in the United States lost its 
innocence on day one” because in 1852 the Harvard and Yale rowing crews were 
lured with lavish prizes and unlimited alcohol).  In the 1880s, Yale had a $100,000 
football slush fund, and the university paid players and offered them jobs.  Id. at 7; 
see also JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA:  THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 37 
(2006) (referring to some college football players during this era as “ringers”). 
8 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 40. 
9 See infra notes 17–36 and accompanying text. 
10 See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 41. 
11 Id. 
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physical, mental, moral, and social benefits directly derived 
therefrom.”12 
Although the period from 1906 to 1920 has been described as 
“generally uneventful for the NCAA,”13 it was also a period 
during which the NCAA “extended its grasp beyond football” 
and attempted to generate support for uniform university 
compliance with NCAA regulations covering eligibility and 
amateurism.14  The tremendous growth in popularity of college 
football beginning in the 1920s15 apparently made actual 
enforcement of the NCAA amateur code so difficult that it 
“presented a dilemma not unlike the one posed by the 
Eighteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution where in it 
prohibited the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages.”16  
Increasingly, it had become evident that reliance upon voluntary 
compliance by NCAA member institutions would not solve the 
myriad problems created by the dramatic expansion of 
intercollegiate athletics and the financial opportunities such 
growth presented.  Without any credible enforcement threat to 
encourage or coerce adherence to rules and regulations, the 
temptation to ignore standards that interfered with athletic and 
financial success was simply too great. 
B.  The Modern Era 
Consequently, in 1948, the NCAA took a significant step by 
adopting the so-called Sanity Code in an effort to develop a 
meaningful enforcement mechanism to assure compliance with 
 
12 SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 7, at 34–35 (quoting NAT’L COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 118 
(1916)).  In 1922, the NCAA redefined the amateur athlete as “one who engages in 
sport solely for the physical, mental, or social benefits he derives therefrom, and to 
whom the sport is nothing more than an avocation.”  Id. at 35 (quoting NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION, (1922)). 
13 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 42. 
14 Id. 
15 See CROWLEY, supra note 7, at 61–66 (describing the “ballyhoo years” and 
explaining how radio fueled public interest in college sports); FLEISHER ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 42–45 (characterizing the period from the 1920s to the 1950s as a 
“golden age” for college football and documenting the growth of college sports and 
its commercialization). 
16 SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 7, at 35.  These commentators note that 
“the NCAA had no effective enforcement powers until 1948 and depended on 
individual schools and conferences to police themselves.”  Id. 
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its rules and regulations.17  The Sanity Code restricted financial 
aid to student-athletes by requiring that recipients utilize the 
“normal channels” that other students were compelled to 
follow.18  Aid was restricted to tuition and fees and could not be 
awarded based on athletic ability.19  In addition, the Sanity Code 
created a compliance mechanism through a Compliance 
Committee that could terminate an institution’s NCAA 
membership.20 
From an antitrust perspective, this attempt to secure 
concerted action from NCAA member institutions also laid the 
foundation for, and increased the likelihood of, Sherman Act 
challenges to rules and regulations that arguably restrained 
competitive forces in the marketplace.21  The transition from an 
advisory set of standards to a joint agreement to adhere to rules 
and regulations, coupled with NCAA enforcement, provided the 
requisite concerted action and potentially anticompetitive 
consequences necessary to invoke Sherman Act antitrust 
principles. 
The Sanity Code did not enjoy a long life; in fact, within two 
years the Code was dead.22  During the 1950s, the NCAA 
developed new regulations governing financial aid to athletes, 
and economic support could now be given without regard to 
financial need or “remarkable academic ability.”23  In essence, 
financial inducements could be used to entice gifted athletes to 
participate in sports and the original amateur ideal had been 
 
17 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 47. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  The Sanity Code also barred university officials from offering financial aid 
to potential students based on athletic ability.  Id. 
20 Id. at 47–48.  The severity of this expulsion penalty and the absence of less 
onerous alternatives arguably caused the “downfall” of the Code.  Id. at 48.  For 
other discussions of the Sanity Code, see CROWLEY, supra note 7, at 69 (describing 
the Code as “not just another in a long line of codes” but one with “teeth”); SACK 
& STAUROWSKY, supra note 7, at 44 (explaining that the Code represented a 
compromise between schools that advocated full athletic scholarships and their 
opponents). 
21 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining that some economists argue 
that “the Sanity Code marks the beginning of the NCAA behaving as an effective 
cartel”). 
22 See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 7, at 46; see also FLEISHER ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 48–50; ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 23. 
23 See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 7, at 47. 
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replaced with a significantly different model.24  Notwithstanding 
this liberalization of the criteria for financial aid to athletes, 
schools began a “spending spree” to buy winning teams.25  
Despite “ever more detailed regulations,” and increased 
enforcement efforts by the NCAA, schools throughout the 
nation “devised new ways to pay their athletes on the side.”26  
The increased commercialization of intercollegiate sports and 
the opportunity to reap vast amounts of revenue from successful 
football and basketball programs created significant incentives 
for schools to do whatever they could to maximize athletic 
success.  The NCAA, with a revised enforcement mechanism 
and rules addressing student-athlete eligibility, “capping” 
financial inducements, limiting transfers, and penalizing “under-
the-table payments,” created the foundation for “today’s 
corporate college sport.”27 
The contemporary array of NCAA rules and regulations 
governing student-athlete eligibility and financial aid finds its 
genesis in the post–Sanity Code developments of the 1950s.  
Today, the NCAA consists of over 1200 educational institutions, 
athletic conferences, and related organizations, and it operates 
national annual championships in twenty-two sports across three 
divisions of athletic competition.28  The NCAA Division I 
Manual contains numerous provisions addressing both student-
athlete academic eligibility issues and questions of amateurism.  
 
24 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 23–24 (noting that in 1956 the NCAA began to 
permit full grants-in-aid that included tuition, fees, room and board, books, and $15 
per month for “laundry money”). 
25 See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 7, at 48. 
26 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 24–25. 
27 SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 7, at 49; see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 51–56 (explaining that the Sanity Code period and subsequent handling of 
enforcement signaled a new era of NCAA regulation). 
28 See In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 
1146 (W.D. Wash. 2005).  In 1997, the NCAA changed its governance structure to 
provide greater autonomy for each division and more control by university and 
college presidents.  See The History of the NCAA, supra note 4.  This restructuring 
allows school and conference athletic department administrators to play a “primary 
role” in the maintenance of college sports and allows them to develop legislation for 
the presidents to consider for each NCAA division.  See NCAA Governance Org 
Chart, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/legislation_and_governance/committees/ 
governance_org_chart.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). 
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Student-athletes may not be represented by agents,29 may 
receive financial aid only to the extent of the “cost of attendance 
that normally is incurred by students enrolled in a comparable 
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29 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2007–08 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.3.1, at 
68 (2007) [hereinafter NCAA Manual], available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/ 
membership/division_i_manual/2007-08/2007-08_d1_manual.pdf. 
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program,”30 and may not accept any “direct or indirect salary, 
gratuity or comparable compensation.”31  Compensation may be 
paid to student-athletes “[o]nly for work actually performed . . . 
[a]t a rate commensurate with the going rate in that locality for 
similar services.”32  Donors may not contribute funds to finance 
a scholarship or grant-in-aid for any particular athlete.33  The 
receipt of improper financial aid by a student-athlete can render 
that person ineligible for intercollegiate athletic competition.34  
Further, the NCAA may establish limits on the number of 
financial aid awards each school may award.35 
These regulations operate to diminish or eliminate potential 
economic competition for players in major NCAA sports such as 
Division I-A (now FBS) football and Division I basketball, 
despite the fact that revenues from those sports may generate 
millions of dollars for the institutions involved.  Players receive 
“compensation” for their athletic contributions in the form of 
scholarships, but the value of the monetary rewards are limited 
by the “caps” created by NCAA rules.  If these issues arose in a 
professional sports context, without the benefit of a collective 
bargaining agreement addressing the limits on competition for 
players and other compensation questions, serious Sherman Act 
antitrust concerns most certainly would arise.36  Whether the 
 
30 Id. § 15.01.6, at 176. 
31 Id. § 12.1.2.1.1, at 63. 
32 Id. § 12.4.1, at 69. 
33 Id. § 15.01.4, at 175. 
34 Id. § 15.01.2, at 175. 
35 Id. § 15.01.7, at 176.  In addition to the economic restraints placed on student-
athletes, the NCAA has imposed a myriad of academic eligibility and performance 
requirements.  See generally MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND 
REGULATION 108–11, 136–39 (2005); PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, 
SPORTS AND THE LAW 770–810 (3d ed. 2004).  This Article does not contend that 
the academic requirements imposed on NCAA student-athletes or institutions 
present significant antitrust questions. 
36 Prior to the development of player unions in professional sports, a number of 
antitrust cases were litigated successfully by players challenging leagues’ attempts to 
regulate competition for players’ services through the draft and restrictions on free 
agency.  See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(striking down NFL draft); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(finding “Rozelle Rule,” which inhibited free agency, illegal); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. 
Supp. 73, 86–87 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (concluding that several restraints on NFL players 
violated federal antitrust law).  Such restraints in professional sports are now 
included in collective bargaining agreements and enjoy protection from antitrust 
law pursuant to the nonstatutory labor exemption.  See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 
518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996); Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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designation of NCAA players as “student-athletes” and 
“amateurs” is sufficient to create a legal distinction is the subject 
of much contemporary scholarly debate and considerable 
antitrust litigation. 
II 
NCAA ANTITRUST LITIGATION–A DICHOTOMOUS 
APPROACH 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in NCAA v. Board 
of Regents,37 very few antitrust claims had been asserted against 
the NCAA.  Courts tended to be dismissive of antitrust 
challenges to NCAA rules and regulations and often focused on 
the NCAA’s alleged noncommercial objectives.38  Federal judges 
resisted the idea of interfering with what was perceived to be a 
legitimate effort to promote amateurism and fair competition in 
NCAA athletics.39  Even when the plaintiff was not a student-
athlete challenging amateurism or eligibility standards, the 
NCAA generally prevailed. 
 
37 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
38 See, e.g., Ass’n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 
577, 584–90 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting Sherman Act claims that the NCAA 
unlawfully used monopoly power in men’s sports to enter women’s sports and force 
plaintiff out of business; effect more important than intent); Hennessey v. NCAA, 
564 F.2d 1136, 1147–54 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting antitrust challenge to NCAA rule 
limiting the number of assistant basketball and football coaches); Weiss v. E. Coll. 
Athletic Conference, 563 F. Supp. 192, 194–96 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting challenge 
to rule requiring one year of ineligibility after transfer); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. 
Supp. 356, 382–84 (D. Ariz. 1983) (rejecting group boycott claim by football players 
whose school had been deemed ineligible for both postseason play and television 
appearances for two years following rule violations); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 
295, 303–04 (D. Mass. 1975) (rejecting antitrust claim by college hockey player 
deemed ineligible for violation of NCAA amateurism rules); Coll. Athletic 
Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,117 (D.N.J. 1974) 
(rejecting boycott claim by college athletic placement company based on NCAA 
rule rendering ineligible any athlete using plaintiff’s services). 
39 However, in Justice v. NCAA, the court did acknowledge that “the NCAA is 
now engaged in two distinct kinds of rulemaking activity.”  Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 
383.  One type is “rooted in the NCAA’s concern for the protection of amateurism; 
the other type is increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic purpose.”  Id.  
The Justice court made this distinction by citing the district court and court of 
appeals decisions in Board of Regents, and by recognizing that the Supreme Court 
had granted certiorari in that significant case.  Id. 
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A.  The Board of Regents Decision and the Dichotomous 
Approach 
In the wake of the relatively few federal district and appellate 
court antitrust decisions dealing with allegedly anticompetitive 
NCAA practices, the Supreme Court decided Board of Regents.  
In the context of an antitrust challenge to the NCAA’s college 
football television plan, the Supreme Court set the stage for the 
modern dichotomous approach to antitrust analysis of NCAA 
regulatory activity.  Importantly, the Supreme Court implicitly 
determined that the NCAA is not a single entity by applying 
section 1 of the Sherman Act to the collective actions of the 
NCAA member institutions.40  Also, the Court was not deterred 
 
40 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99 (noting that the NCAA is “an association of 
schools which compete against each other to attract television revenues”); see also 
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (reaffirming that the NCAA is not a single entity).  Section I of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), only applies to concerted rather than 
unilateral conduct in restraint of trade.  The prevailing view regarding professional 
sports is that leagues are not single entities; rather, they are a combination of 
separate teams cooperating to produce a joint product.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. NFL, 34 
F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 
1381, 1387–90 (9th Cir. 1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251–
52 (2d Cir. 1982); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues:  Re-
examining the Threshold Questions, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 958–70 (1988).  But see 
Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149, 152 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); S.F. Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 
379 F. Supp. 966, 969–70 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (supporting single entity approach).  Cf. 
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597–601 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(suggesting that the NBA might be a single entity for some purposes).  See also Am. 
Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(identifying NFL as a single entity for “league-wide policy other than labor 
disputes”); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a 
Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act:  Implications of the Consumer 
Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14–23 (1983) (criticizing cases denying single 
entity status to the NFL); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act:  
The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 219, 260–62 (1984) (arguing that courts improperly treat teams as 
separate entities); Nathaniel Grow, Note, There’s No “I” in “League”:  Professional 
Sports Leagues and the Single Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183 (2006) 
(suggesting that courts should presume sports leagues are single entities in nonlabor 
matter).  Recently, one commentator argued that college conferences should be 
viewed as single entity sports leagues, but that the NCAA itself is not a single actor.  
See Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking:  A 
New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 80–
82 (2006).  This Article does not address potential NCAA liability pursuant to 
section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
2007] The NCAA in Its Second Century 339 
by either the nonprofit status of the NCAA41 or the NCAA’s 
“good motives” in acting as the “guardian of an important 
American tradition.”42 
Although the Court’s focus in Board of Regents was on the 
antitrust implications of output and price restraints regarding the 
presentation of college football on television,43 Justice Stevens 
did utter now famous (perhaps infamous) dicta about the role of 
the NCAA in maintaining a distinction between amateur 
intercollegiate athletics and minor league professional sports. 
Justice Stevens opined that “[i]n order to preserve the character 
and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be 
required to attend class, and the like.”44  The issue of academic 
and economic regulation of college athletes was not directly 
before the Court, but the majority opinion nevertheless laid a 
strong foundation for subsequent arguments that the antitrust 
laws should not invalidate restraints on competition for the 
services of NCAA student-athletes. 
The Board of Regents decision made another important 
contribution to the debate over application of antitrust principles 
to NCAA regulations when it concluded that “maintaining a 
competitive balance among amateur athletic teams is legitimate 
and important.”45  Despite the fact that the college television 
plan at issue ultimately was determined not to promote 
competitive balance in any significant way,46 the Court seemingly 
accepted the notion that collective action by sports leagues that 
demonstrably enhanced competitive balance was indeed a 
legitimate, procompetitive justification that should be 
 
41 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–02.  The Court noted that the “economic 
significance of the NCAA’s nonprofit character is questionable at best.”  Id. at 100 
n.22. 
42 Id. at 101 n.23.  The Court explained that “good motives will not validate an 
otherwise anticompetitive practice.”  Id. 
43 The Court ruled that the NCAA had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by 
limiting television appearances for college teams and fixing the price of televised 
games.  See id. at 120.  It also utilized rule of reason analysis rather than a per se 
rule because league sports require some horizontal restraints to produce a finished 
product.  Id. at 100–02. 
44 Id. at 102 (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 117. 
46 Id. at 117–20.  Justice Stevens asserted that the NCAA imposes a variety of 
restraints to preserve amateurism that address the goal of competitive balance.  Id. 
at 119. 
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considered in a rule of reason antitrust analysis.47  This 
recognition of competitive balance as a valid concern could 
potentially justify some NCAA restraints on competition for 
student-athletes. 
Board of Regents provided important precedential support for 
the two-pronged antitrust approach to NCAA regulation.  The 
Supreme Court suggested that while joint economic action by 
NCAA members on matters not dealing with the regulation of 
players should be subjected to rule of reason analysis under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, regulations governing player 
eligibility and amateurism might be exempt or at least subject to 
less stringent antitrust scrutiny.48  The foundation for a 
dichotomous antitrust approach to the NCAA’s conduct was 
now in place, despite the fact that economic restraints on 
student-athletes were not even before the Court. 
In the wake of Board of Regents, lower federal courts seized 
the opportunity to treat NCAA player restraints in a 
significantly different manner from other NCAA regulations.  
When dealing with antitrust claims in a nonplayer context, the 
judicial approach has been rather unremarkable and consistent 
with more traditional antitrust methodology.  However, when 
restraints in alleged player service markets arise, federal courts 
either decline to apply antitrust doctrine at all, or seem to adopt 
a more deferential approach that protects the NCAA from 
successful challenges to its regulatory scheme.  As a result, 
antitrust cases in the amateur athletic context tend to reach 
results similar to those in professional sports on issues not 
involving players, but courts reach markedly different 
conclusions when considering player restraints.  Sometimes, 
however, these attempted lines of demarcation are blurred.49 
B.  NCAA Regulation and Nonplayers 
In recent cases, mainstream antitrust principles have been 
invoked to deal with claims by nonplayer market participants. 
For example, in Law v. NCAA,50 the Court of Appeals for the 
 
47 This conclusion is contrary to the result reached in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), where competitive balance was deemed irrelevant in 
a rule of reason analysis dealing with the NFL draft. 
48 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 123. 
49 See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text. 
50 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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Tenth Circuit utilized the so-called “quick look” rule of reason 
to invalidate an NCAA rule limiting the annual compensation of 
certain entry-level coaches.51  The NCAA proffered three 
alleged procompetitive justifications for the horizontal salary 
restraint:  (1) retention of entry-level positions; (2) cost 
reduction; and (3) competitive balance.52  In rejecting these 
attempted rationales for the challenged practice, the court 
endorsed the idea that competitive balance was a legitimate, 
procompetitive objective, but found that the salary restriction 
failed to actually promote that goal.53  The court applied rather 
straightforward Sherman Act principles and concluded that the 
restraint had a net anticompetitive effect rendering it illegal 
under the rule of reason.54  It mattered not that the coaches were 
employees at NCCA institutions or that they were teaching 
student-athletes.55  The coaches were engaged in a trade or 
business and competition for their services had been restrained 
unreasonably through the concerted action of their employers.56  
Unless the obvious anticompetitive impact of the artificial “cap” 
on their salaries could be offset by countervailing benefits to 
competition in some legally cognizable relevant market, the 
coaches had to prevail. 
In Worldwide Basketball and Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA,57 
the Sixth Circuit similarly applied conventional antitrust analysis 
to an NCAA rule limiting member institutions’ participation in 
outside men’s basketball tournaments.  The plaintiffs were 
promoters of outside certified tournament events who argued 
 
51 Id. at 1020.  The court noted that the quick look approach may be applied 
when anticompetitive effects are so obvious that it is appropriate to proceed directly 
to the question of whether there are valid procompetitive justifications for a 
restraint.  Id. at 1020–21. 
52 Id. at 1021–24. 
53 Id.  In reaching this conclusion the Law court distinguished and disagreed with 
the approach taken in Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977), which 
affirmed the dismissal of an antitrust claim challenging a limit on the number of 
assistant football and basketball coaches.  Law, 134 F.3d at 1020–21. 
54 Id. at 1019–20. 
55 Id. at 1022. 
56 Interestingly, while the court rejected the idea of considering “social” values 
apart from competitive impact, it did note that “courts should afford the NCAA 
plenty of room under the antitrust laws to preserve the amateur character of 
intercollegiate athletics.  Id. at 1021 n.14.  This distinction arguably carries forward 
the dichotomy suggested by Board of Regents. 
57 388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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that the NCAA had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by 
imposing the challenged restraints.58  Although the Court of 
Appeals rejected the district court’s use of a quick-look rule of 
reason in granting an injunction,59 it unequivocally recognized 
that federal antitrust law applies to NCAA activity that restrains 
competition in commercial markets.60  More specifically, the 
court noted that “[t]he dispositive inquiry . . . is whether the rule 
itself is commercial, not whether the entity promulgating the rule 
is commercial.”61  The Sixth Circuit had no difficulty concluding 
that the so-called “Two in Four Rule”62 “has some commercial 
impact insofar as it regulates games that constitute sources of 
revenue for both the member schools and the Promoters.”63 
Turning to the merits, the Worldwide Basketball opinion then 
acknowledged that some rule of reason cases may be decided 
pursuant to a truncated, quick-look approach when 
anticompetitive effects are obvious and no elaborate market 
analysis is required prior to an examination of countervailing 
procompetitive justifications.64  However, the facts in Worldwide 
Basketball led the court to conclude that a quick-look analysis 
was inappropriate because anticompetitive effects were not 
sufficiently conspicuous.65  Rather, it was incumbent on the 
plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a relevant market and 
the presence of actual anticompetitive effects within that 
market.66  The contours of a relevant market were not “readily 
apparent,” and therefore it was impossible to assess any 
anticompetitive effects “on customers rather than merely on 
competitors.”67 
 
58 Id. at 957–58. 
59 Id. at 961. 
60 Id. at 958. 
61 Id. at 959. 
62 The rule challenged in this case permitted each team to participate in one 
“certified” basketball event per academic year and in not more than two such 
events every four years.  Id. at 957. 
63 Id. at 959. 
64 Id. at 960–61.  In making this observation, the court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Board of Regents as well as other Supreme Court and lower 
federal court decisions. 
65 Id. at 961. 
66 See id. at 961–64. 
67 Id. at 961.  Although the district court had determined the relevant market to 
be “Division I mens’ [sic] college basketball,” the record was insufficient to support 
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Despite the fact that the NCAA prevailed in Worldwide 
Basketball, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless established that when 
NCAA regulations do have an anticompetitive impact on 
nonplayers, they may be subject to rule of reason scrutiny under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.68  The court’s decision to use the 
full-blown, structured rule of reason approach, rather than a 
quick-look rule of reason, signals that the court was not 
convinced that the alleged anticompetitive effects were 
sufficiently obvious.  No antitrust immunity or exemption was 
conferred on the NCAA; rather, section 1 of the Sherman Act 
applied to NCAA conduct that had a commercial impact.  The 
plaintiffs, however, were compelled to prove all the essential 
components of a valid Sherman Act claim.  Had the plaintiffs 
more effectively defined a relevant market, they might have 
prevailed.  In contrast, in a case like Law, the anticompetitive 
effects were sufficiently obvious to relieve plaintiffs of the 
obligation to define and prove the existence of a relevant market 
and the requisite anticompetitive effects within the well-defined 
market.69  Thus, the common thread running through these 
decisions is that NCAA rules and regulations that have an 
obvious or demonstrable anticompetitive impact in legally 
 
that market definition and the appellate court felt compelled to reverse the granting 
of a permanent injunction.  Id. at 962–63. 
68 See id. at 961. 
69 In another challenge to NCAA rules that involved men’s college basketball 
tournaments, a federal district court denied both plaintiffs’ and the NCAA’s 
motions for summary judgment.  See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. 
NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball 
Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  This dispute involved 
NCAA rules that were alleged to reduce competition from non-NCAA sponsored 
preseason and postseason tournaments.  Judge Cedarbaum declined to find that the 
NCAA rules were either reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of law.  Triable 
issues of fact were presented on both section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act claims.  
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 569, 573.  
Although this litigation ultimately was settled with an NCAA buyout of the NIT, 
the summary judgment decisions strongly support the idea that antitrust law applies 
to NCAA activity that has a competitive impact on competitors and other 
nonplayer market participants as well as the marketplace.  Cf. Bassett v. NCAA, 
2005-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 24,822 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (finding that NCAA recruiting 
rules governing coaches’ conduct are “not commercial in nature”); Adidas Am., Inc. 
v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 1999) (dismissing antitrust claim 
challenging NCAA by-law limiting size of advertising space on uniforms during 
NCAA games; finding absence of purpose or effect of giving NCAA or member 
schools any economic advantage in a commercial transaction). 
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cognizable relevant markets may be the subject of federal 
antitrust challenges. 
C.  NCAA Restraints on Student-Athletes 
In contrast to the rather traditional antitrust methodology 
utilized in Law and other cases not involving student-athletes, 
disputes involving alleged restraints on NCAA players have 
proceeded down a somewhat different legal path.  In some cases, 
antitrust claims have been rejected summarily because jurists 
have determined that antitrust laws have no application to 
restraints on amateur student-athletes.  In other cases, courts 
have engaged in antitrust analyses but concluded that the 
NCAA acted lawfully in imposing restraints.  Further, some 
courts have suggested that, at least at the preliminary stages of 
litigation, NCAA athlete claims can move forward.  In the 
process of perpetuating the dichotomy suggested by Board of 
Regents, lower federal courts also are beginning to blur the 
distinction between restraints on players and restraints on other 
actors. 
1.  Inapplicability of Antitrust Principles 
Several antitrust decisions simply determine that the antitrust 
laws should not apply to NCAA rules governing eligibility and 
amateurism.  A pre–Board of Regents example of this approach 
is Jones v. NCAA,70 where a college hockey player lost his 
eligibility after violating amateurism rules by receiving improper 
compensation.71  The court decided that “the instant case is 
particularly inappropriate for application of the Sherman Act,” 
because the plaintiff “is currently a student, not a businessman in 
the traditional sense, and certainly not a ‘competitor’ within the 
contemplation of the antitrust laws.”72  Thus, the Jones court 
concluded that the “competition” the plaintiff sought to protect 
was not in any legally cognizable market but “in the hockey rink 
as part of the educational program of a major university” 
 
70 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975). 
71 Id. at 297–98. 
72 Id. at 303. 
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without “any nexus to commercial or business activities” of the 
NCAA.73 
In a similar vein, in Gaines v. NCAA,74 another federal district 
court denied a college football player’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction in an antitrust challenge to the NCAA’s rule declaring 
ineligible any player who participates in the National Football 
League draft.75  The court relied on the dichotomy attributable 
to Board of Regents and explained that “there is a clear 
difference between the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the televising 
of college football games and the NCAA’s efforts to maintain a 
discernible line between amateurism and professionalism and 
protect the amateur objectives of NCAA college football by 
enforcing the eligibility rules.”76  Relying on Board of Regents, as 
well as cases like Justice and Jones, the Gaines court opined that 
“[e]ven in the increasingly commercial modern world, this Court 
believes there is still validity to the Athenian concept of a 
complete education derived from fostering full growth of both 
mind and body.”77  The court concluded that because the 
“overriding purpose” of the NCAA’s no-draft rule was to 
“preserve the unique atmosphere of competition between 
‘student-athletes,’” the NCAA regulation should not even be 
addressed under federal antitrust law.78 
In Smith v. NCAA,79 a student-athlete challenged an NCAA 
rule prohibiting a graduate student from participating in 
intercollegiate athletics at any institution other than the one at 
which the student had been an undergraduate.80  The Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that 
the Sherman Act did not apply to this type of NCAA 
 
73 Id.  The Jones court also indicated that, even if federal antitrust laws applied to 
the case, it was unlikely that plaintiff could prevail.  Id.  The court based this 
conclusion on the absence of any anticompetitive “scienter” attributable to the 
NCAA.  See id. at 303–04. 
74 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
75 See id. at 740. 
76 Id. at 743. 
77 Id. at 744. 
78 Id.  However, the Gaines court, like the court in Jones, went on to analyze the 
no-draft rule on the assumption that federal antitrust law applied.  It similarly 
determined that the plaintiff would likely fail on the merits of his antitrust claim.  
Id. at 745–47. 
79 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
80 Id. at 182. 
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regulation.81  The Third Circuit noted that “the Supreme Court 
has suggested that antitrust laws are limited in their application 
to commercial and business endeavors.”82  Thus, because the 
NCAA eligibility rules “are not related to the NCAA’s 
commercial or business activities,” nor intended to give the 
NCAA “a commercial advantage,” they are protected from 
antitrust scrutiny as a means to “ensure fair competition.”83 
More recently, in Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. 
NCAA,84 a district court declared that federal antitrust law 
should not be applied to certain NCAA regulations.85  
Interestingly, this decision addressed the question in a context 
that more directly affected the business interests of nonathletes.  
The plaintiffs in Pocono were operators of for-profit summer 
basketball camps for children and teenagers.86  The camp 
operators challenged a series of NCAA rules that dealt with 
issues like certification of camps and NCAA coach visits.87  In 
essence, plaintiffs argued that the pattern of NCAA regulation 
inhibited their ability to compete in the market for summer 
basketball camps in the United States.88 
Despite the fact that the antitrust plaintiffs in Pocono were 
not even student-athletes challenging amateurism or eligibility 
rules, the court nevertheless treated the NCAA rules as the 
equivalent of regulations designed to promote amateurism.  
Relying on decisions like Smith, Gaines, and Jones, the Pocono 
court determined that “when the NCAA promulgated these 
rules it was acting in a paternalistic capacity to promote 
amateurism and education,” and therefore these “recruiting 
 
81 Id. at 184–86. 
82 Id. at 185. 
83 Id.  The Smith court purported to distinguish Law as a decision involving a 
horizontal price restraint in a commercial activity.  Id. at 186.  The Smith court also 
followed the approach taken in Jones and Gaines by engaging in an antitrust 
analysis on the assumption that federal law applied.  In so doing, it concluded that, 
even if rule of reason analysis applied, the procompetitive virtue of preserving 
amateur intercollegiate athletics and an even playing field would validate the 
challenged regulation.  Id. at 186–87; see also Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 
497–98 (D.N.J. 1998) (dismissing eligibility claim). 
84 317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
85 See id. at 584. 
86 Id. at 571–72.  Plaintiffs’ camps competed with camps operated by some 
NCAA members.  Id. at 572. 
87 See id. at 572–79. 
88 See id. at 586. 
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rules are also immune.”89  The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim 
that “the rules are commercial because they impose costs on the 
camps and affect who can coach at and visit the camps,” 
dismissing these alleged effects as merely “incidental.”90 
Even though the restraints in Pocono did not fit neatly into 
the student-athlete part of the dichotomy suggested by Board of 
Regents, the court nevertheless chose to treat the challenged 
rules as if they did involve amateurism and eligibility issues.  
This arguably blurs any clear line of demarcation between 
NCAA economic regulation and rulemaking focusing on the 
student-athlete. 
2.  Judicial Consideration of Antitrust Claims on the Merits 
Another line of precedent addressing NCAA regulation of 
intercollegiate athletes applies federal antitrust law and engages 
in a rule of reason analysis on the merits.  In addition, even cases 
initially concluding that the Sherman Act does not apply often 
offer opinions regarding the substantive analysis.  However, 
these cases also determine that student-athletes cannot prevail, 
and they endorse NCAA regulation as a means of preserving the 
distinctiveness of amateur sports and promoting competitive 
equity. 
In McCormack v. NCAA,91 alumni, college football players, 
and cheerleaders challenged an NCAA regulation regarding 
compensation restrictions for student-athletes.92  More 
specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the rule in question amounted 
to illegal price fixing and a boycott in violation of the Sherman 
Act.93  Assuming for purposes of its decision that the football 
players had antitrust standing and that the antitrust laws applied 
 
89 Id. at 584. 
90 See id.  In somewhat cryptic fashion, the court did note that, even though “[t]he 
rules challenged in this case do not constitute trade or commerce[,] . . . [c]ertainly 
there are recruiting rules that[,] . . . under the rule of reason, would be cognizable 
under the Sherman Act.”  Id. at 584 n.16.  The court made no attempt to clarify this 
comment or provide any examples.  The Pocono decision, like several earlier ones, 
also went on to discuss the merits of the case on the assumption that antitrust law 
did apply.  In so doing, it determined that plaintiffs could not prevail on the merits 
because they failed to adequately define a relevant market.  Id. at 586–87. 
91 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). 
92 Id. at 1340. 
93 Id. 
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to NCAA eligibility rules,94 the court invoked the rule of reason 
and found “little difficulty in concluding that the challenged 
restrictions are reasonable.”95 
In support of this conclusion, the McCormack court relied on 
Board of Regents and opined that “[i]t is reasonable to assume 
that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable 
means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams 
and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public 
interest in intercollegiate athletics.”96  Thus, the court found that 
the NCAA “markets college football as a product distinct from 
professional football[,] [and] [t]he eligibility rules create the 
product and allow its survival in the face of commercializing 
pressures.”97  The NCAA’s goal “is to integrate athletics with 
academics” and the challenged restrictions “reasonably further 
this goal.”98  The McCormack court further noted that because 
“the NCAA has not distilled amateurism to its purest form does 
not mean its attempts to maintain a mixture containing some 
amateur elements are unreasonable.”99  Thus, the antitrust 
attack failed because the court believed that creating a line of 
demarcation between professional and amateur sports by 
restricting compensation to student-athletes was legally 
permissible and procompetitive under federal antitrust law.100 
Similarly, in Banks v. NCAA,101 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a college football player’s 
antitrust challenge to the NCAA’s no-draft and no-agent rules, 
which had terminated the athlete’s eligibility to participate in 
intercollegiate sports.102  The court noted that the district court 
had dismissed Banks’s antitrust claim because of a failure to 
allege an anticompetitive effect in any “identifiable market.”103  
The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on Board of Regents as 
support for the notion that keeping a clear line of demarcation 
 
94 Id. at 1342–43. 
95 Id. at 1344. 
96 Id. (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). 
97 Id. at 1344–45. 
98 Id. at 1345. 
99 Id. 
100 See id. at 1343–45. 
101 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
102 See id. at 1082. 
103 Id. at 1086–87. 
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between professional and amateur sports is a valid and lawful 
objective.104 
The Banks court considered “college football players as 
student-athletes simultaneously pursuing academic degrees that 
will prepare them to enter the employment market in non-
athletic occupations,” and held that “the regulations of the 
NCAA are designed to preserve the honesty and integrity of 
intercollegiate athletics and foster fair competition among the 
participating amateur college students.”105  Thus, while the court 
relied primarily on Banks’s failure to allege any anticompetitive 
effects within a legally cognizable relevant market, it supported 
its conclusions by emphasizing the need to maintain clear 
distinctions between professional and amateur sports.  The 
Seventh Circuit rejected the idea that the players are sources of 
labor,106 and focused instead on the myriad NCAA rules 
designed to promote the idea that intercollegiate athletic 
participation is part of an overall educational experience for the 
student-athlete.107 
 
104 See id. at 1089–90. 
105 Id. at 1090.  The court noted that its conclusion was “buttressed by the fact 
that a very small number of college athletes go on to participate in professional 
athletics.”  Id. at 1090 n.12.  Elaborating, the court explained that out of over 12,000 
Division I-A college football players, fewer than 300 get to the NFL each year.  Id. 
106 Id. at 1090–91. 
107 The court noted that NCAA rules require class attendance, minimum grade 
point averages, and satisfaction of other academic standards.  Id. at 1090.  The court 
also explained that: 
We should not permit the entry of professional athletes and their agents 
into NCAA sports because the cold commercial nature of professional 
sports would not only destroy the amateur status of college athletics but 
more importantly would interfere with the athletes [sic] proper focus on 
their educational pursuits and direct their attention to the quick buck in 
pro sports. 
Id. at 1091.  In Gaines v. NCAA (a section 2 case), after the court initially concluded 
that federal antitrust law should not even apply to NCAA eligibility rules, it went 
on to offer an alternative ruling on the merits.  746 F. Supp. 738, 744–45 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1990).  In so doing, it also endorsed the idea that NCAA regulation preserves 
the “amateur appeal” of college football.  Id. at 746.  Keeping NCAA football 
distinct from the NFL product arguably widens consumer choice and is therefore 
procompetitive.  Id. at 747.  Other cases that initially conclude that NCAA 
amateurism rules should not trigger substantive antitrust analysis but nevertheless 
go on to consider the merits include Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), 
vacated in part on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999), Pocono Invitational Sports 
Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 2004), and Jones v. NCAA, 392 
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).  These cases also focus on plaintiffs’ problems with 
market definition, the NCAA’s desire to maintain a clear line of demarcation 
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3.  A Blurring of the Dichotomy 
Although the foregoing cases appear to maintain the 
dichotomous approach suggested in Board of Regents by 
addressing restrictions imposed on college athletes differently 
from restraints on more traditional market participants, any 
clear line of distinction may be breaking down.  In In Re NCAA 
I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation,108 nonscholarship, 
walk-on football players challenged the NCAA’s limitation on 
the number of full grant-in-aid football scholarships.109  
Although the court clearly stated that athletes may not be paid 
to play,110 it also emphasized that the NCAA is not exempt from 
Sherman Act scrutiny and that financial aid to college students 
should be regarded as commercial activity.111  The court then 
refused to grant the NCAA judgment on the pleadings because 
it viewed the scholarship limitation as different from other 
NCAA eligibility rules dealing with class attendance or entering 
a professional draft.112  Relying on plaintiffs’ allegations that the 
cap on full scholarships was motivated by cost containment goals 
rather than an effort to promote competitive balance, the court 
declined to dismiss at the pleading stage.113  The court also 
seemingly departed from earlier case law by finding that 
plaintiffs’ allegation of a relevant market of “Division I-A 
football” was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.114  
 
between professional and amateur athletics, and the promotion of fair competition 
as reasons for rejecting antitrust claims challenging NCAA rules.  See also Tanaka 
v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting antitrust 
challenge to intercollegiate athletic association rule on transfer student athletic 
eligibility for failure to allege proper market or anticompetitive effects); Hairston v. 
Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that sanctions for 
recruiting violations were not an antitrust violation, and that maintaining a 
distinction between amateur and professional sports is a valid goal). 
108 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
109 Id. at 1146–47.  The NCAA rule limited the number of football scholarships to 
85.  Id. at 1147. 
110 Id. at 1148. 
111 Id. at 1149. 
112 Id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 1150.  The court noted that a relevant product market includes the 
pool of goods or services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-
elasticity of demand.  Id.  This test for product market definition is derived from 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394–95 (1956).  See 
also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–72 (1966); Int’l Boxing Club 
of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1959). 
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Elaborating, the court explained that the plaintiffs had alleged 
“a sufficient ‘input’ market in which NCAA member schools 
compete for skilled amateur football players.”115 
 
115 Id.  Plaintiffs also adequately alleged NCAA market power and competitive 
harm by asserting that the NCAA is a monopsonist–i.e., a dominant buyer in the 
relevant market.  Id. at 1151.  It would be more accurate to view the NCAA as a 
collusive monopsonist.  In any event, monopsony may injure “efficient allocation by 
reducing the quantity of the input product or service below the efficient level.”  
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK, 155 (2d ed. 2006); see also Stephen R. Ross, The 
Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 
U. ILL. L. REV. 519 (discussing consumer welfare and effect of player restraints on 
product quality in professional sports).  Subsequently, class certification was denied 
in this case.  In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 2006-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 75,314, at 105,203 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2006).  The case was then 
dismissed by stipulation of the parties and order of the court on May 22, 2007. 
 However, another recent antitrust claim against NCAA restraints on student-
athletes is proceeding.  On September 21, 2006, in an unreported order and opinion 
in White v. NCAA, Judge Klausner denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the 
Second Amended Complaint in an antitrust challenge to its grant-in-aid cap on 
financial awards to student-athletes.  See White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-999-RGK, 
slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://www1.ncaa.org/eprise/ 
main/administrator/white_v_ncaa/11.pdf.  The court found that the plaintiff class 
had adequately alleged NCAA market power in relevant product and geographic 
markets–major college football and major college basketball within the United 
States.  Id. at 3.  The complaint alleged that there were no reasonably 
interchangeable substitutes.  Id.  The court also ruled that plaintiffs had sufficiently 
pled harm to competition by alleging that student-athletes, as consumers of a 
unique combination of higher education and coaching services, were adversely 
affected by the financial aid cap.  Id. at 4.  On October 19, 2006, the court granted 
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.  White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK, 
slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006), available at http://www1.ncaa.org/eprise/ 
main/administrator/white_v_ncaa/15.pdf. 
 The case was scheduled for trial in January 2008, but has been postponed pending 
settlement negotiations.  Newsire:  NCAA Aid Limits Could Be Raised, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2008, at D7.  The parties have reached a tentative settlement to the lawsuit.  
Greg Johnson & Robyn Norwood, NCAA Settles Expense Suit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2008, at D9; see also Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement Between Plaintiffs 
and Defendant NCAA, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999 VBF (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 
2008), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/resources/file/ 
eb275f4ccd66f16/Stipulation_and_Agreement_of_Settlement_between_White_and_
NCAA.PDF?MOD=AJPERES.  The settlement provides that the NCAA denies 
any wrongdoing but will make available $218 million to Division I schools for 
academic years 2007–08 through 2012–13 to be used under guidelines for the 
Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund.  The NCAA will provide an additional $10 
million over three years to be distributed on a claims-made basis to qualifying 
former student-athletes.  On February 4, 2008, the court preliminarily approved the 
settlement and scheduled a final hearing for June 30, 2008.  See Order Preliminarily 
Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice to the Class, White v. NCAA, No. 
CV 06-0999 VBF (C.D. Cal Feb 4, 2008), available at http://www.ncaaclassaction 
.com/pa.pdf.  For a very recent discussion of White, see Christian Dennie, White Out 
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The Walk-On decision could be viewed simply as an example 
of judicial reluctance to dismiss an antitrust complaint at the 
pleading stage when plausible allegations have been articulated.  
However, the case may have more profound implications.  First, 
when compared and contrasted with the Pocono decision, Walk-
On suggests a blurring of any real distinction between NCAA 
regulations addressing athletes as opposed to rules affecting 
more traditional market participants.  In Pocono, even though 
the plaintiffs were business people operating basketball camps, 
the court treated the challenged restraint as if it related to 
student-athlete eligibility.  In Walk-On, even though the 
regulation directly affected student-athletes, the court allowed 
the case to proceed.  Walk-On also arguably represents a 
departure from the cases that decline to recognize any “market” 
for the services of student-athletes. 
In sum, it appears that the Board of Regents dicta that 
apparently endorsed a dichotomous approach to antitrust 
analysis regarding NCAA regulation is ripe for reconsideration.  
More specifically, the line of demarcation between professional 
and intercollegiate athletics is not as clear as some would have it, 
and NCAA regulations directed at student-athletes should be 
properly characterized as more commercial in nature than 
earlier case law suggests.  The subsequent sections of this Article 
both criticize the state of the case law and offer some alternative 
approaches to the current jurisprudence. 
III 
A CRITIQUE OF THE DICHOTOMOUS APPROACH 
Over two decades of antitrust decision making regarding the 
NCAA have followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of 
Regents.  The preceding section of the Article explains how these 
cases have borrowed from Board of Regents’ dicta and 
approached NCAA antitrust disputes by attempting to 
distinguish between restraints on student-athletes and restraints 
on conventional business people.  As a result, the courts have 
treated antitrust claims by traditional market participants more 
seriously than those advanced by players.  More recently, 
however, it appears that any clear distinction between these two 
 
Full Grant-in-Aid:  An Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 97 (2007). 
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categories of cases is eroding.  Perhaps this signals that a more 
realistic and economically sound view of contemporary NCAA 
athletics may be emerging. 
A.  The Existence of a Legally Cognizable Market for Student-
Athletes 
Judicial reliance on the dichotomy suggested by Board of 
Regents has been criticized frequently and consistently by 
commentators with good reason.116  Without student-athletes, 
the NCAA could not pursue its commercial goals or realize any 
of its economic objectives.  Simply put, college players are the 
raw materials comprising the most essential ingredient of any 
NCAA sports product.  Some commentators even contend that 
student-athletes are the equivalent of professional athletes for 
 
116 See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust:  Should College Students Be Paid 
to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 213–15 (1990); C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay 
for Play for College Athletes:  Now, More than Ever, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1089–
94 (1997); Thomas R. Kobin, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s No 
Agent and No Draft Rules:  The Realities of Collegiate Sports Are Forcing Change, 4 
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 483, 515 (1994); James V. Koch, The Economic Realities 
of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9, 15–16 (1985); Matthew J. Mitten, 
University Price Competition for Elite Students and Athletes:  Illusions and Realities, 
36 S. TEX. L. REV. 59, 61–64 (1995); Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason:  
Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS 
L. REV. 331, 335–42 (2005); Christopher Parent, Forward Progress?  An Analysis of 
Whether Student-Athletes Should Be Paid, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 226, 244–47 
(2004); Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete:  Undermining 
Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 
HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 37–41 (2000); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and 
Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2654–57 (1996); Marc Edelman, Note, 
Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 861, 871–77 (2002); Kristin R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening It’s Own 
Defense?  The NCAA’s Version of Amatuerism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 
265–72 (2003); Stephen M. Schott, Comment, Give Them What They Deserve:  
Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 
SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 36–37 (1996); Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA 
Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1307–08 (1992).  Cf. Benjamin A. 
Menzel, Comment, Heading down the Wrong Road?:  Why Deregulating 
Amateurism May Cause Future Legal Problems for the NCAA, 12 MARQ. SPORTS 
L. REV. 857, 867–72 (2002) (suggesting that deregulation of amateurism may create 
complications, including more antitrust problems).  Other commentators are less 
critical.  See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-
Athletes, and the NCAA:  Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic 
Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545, 574–75; Richard B. McKenzie & E. Thomas 
Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College Athletes?  An Economics and Legal 
Reinterpretation, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 373, 389–95 (1987).  See also MITTEN ET 
AL., supra note 35, at 280–81 (collecting literature and noting different viewpoints). 
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labor law purposes.117  The notion that there is no real 
competition for the services of NCAA athletes flies in the face of 
undeniable facts.  Vigorous recruiting efforts, particularly for the 
best high school football and basketball players, are an integral 
part of every college coaching staff’s duties.118 
Courts have realized that dealings between institutions of 
higher education and their students often are unquestionably 
commercial in nature and therefore may be susceptible to 
antitrust challenges.119  Further, the assumption that so-called 
student-athletes in high profile Division I football and basketball 
programs are students first and athletes second may reflect more 
of an idealistic fantasy than modern reality.120  It may be more 
 
117 It has been suggested that NCAA athletes should be treated as employees for 
purpose of federal labor law.  See, e.g., Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian 
McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete:  The College Athlete as Employee, 81 
WASH. L. REV. 71, 79 (2006); J. Trevor Johnston, Comment, Show Them the 
Money:  The Threat of NCAA Athlete Unionization in Response to the 
Commercialization of College Sports, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 203, 231–33 
(2003); Jonathan L.H. Nygren, Note, Forcing the NCAA to Listen:  Using Labor 
Law to Force the NCAA to Bargain Collectively with Student-Athletes, 2 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 371–84 (2003); see also C. Peter Goplerud III, Stipends for 
Collegiate Athletes:  A Philosophical Spin on a Controversial Proposal, 5 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 125, 127–29 (1996) (raising the question of possible employment 
status); cf. Rohith A. Parasuraman, Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics:  A 
Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 750–52 (2007) (suggesting that Congress decide 
whether athletes are employees). 
118 See Ray Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprint for the Reform of Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 123, 132 (1993) (noting schools “participating in 
‘big-time’ intercollegiate athletics spend considerable resources ferreting out 
athletic talent and luring the talented to their respective campuses”); see also 
MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC. 229–55 (1990) (discussing the 
recruitment process); TED WEISSBERG, BREAKING THE RULES 49–62 (1995) 
(detailing the extensive recruiting efforts for top athletes). 
119 See Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 
67–68 (2d Cir. 1997) (alleged monopolization of student housing subject to antitrust 
laws); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665–68 (3d Cir. 1993) (financial aid 
agreement subject to Sherman Act; exchange of money for services, even by 
nonprofit educational institutions, is a “quintessential commercial transaction”). 
120 The academic ideal to which the NCAA clings–that student-athletes are 
students first and players second–may be more fictional than real.  See MURRAY 
SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS 130–34 (2000) (discussing academic fraud and 
cheating); SPERBER, supra note 118, at 277–85 (discussing lack of academic progress 
among athletes); McCormick & McCormick, supra note 117, at 122 (noting that top 
college athletes “do not spend the majority of their time engaged in learning, 
education and academic inquiry, but rather in furtherance of their work as 
athletes”).  In fairness, the NCAA has made efforts to improve academic integrity 
and standards for student-athletes.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text; infra 
note 134 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate to view many of the best college athletes as 
professionals-in-training at NCAA-fixed levels of compensation.  
Regardless of whether NCAA student-athletes are viewed 
primarily as employees or students, they are inextricably 
intertwined with university activities that are irrefutably 
commercial. 
This economic reality calls into serious question the validity of 
the dichotomy attributable to Board of Regents and cases relying 
on the distinction between NCAA rules dealing with student-
athletes and other forms of regulation.  That is not to say that all 
NCAA requirements should trigger antitrust analysis; rather, 
only NCAA rules restraining interstate trade or commerce 
should be vulnerable to Sherman Act challenges.  Some NCAA 
rules affecting student-athletes, such as those addressing 
academic requirements or the use of performance enhancing 
substances, would seem to generate no significant antitrust 
concerns.  However, the amateurism rules that restrict 
compensation and other economic benefits to NCAA athletes 
should not escape antitrust scrutiny by means of a dichotomy 
that does not comport with real world economic models.  
Salutary purposes advanced by the NCAA to support its 
regulations should not supplant judicial scrutiny of the actual 
economic effects of NCAA rulemaking. 
There is indeed a “market” for NCAA athletes in different 
sports and “compensation” for these athletes is paid in the form 
of scholarships.  Collectively, NCAA members completely 
control these markets.  What the NCAA has done is place a 
“cap” or “ceiling” on payments that would raise serious antitrust 
questions in the context of professional athletics.121  If courts 
 
121 In professional sports, prior to the evolution of a collective bargaining 
relationship between player unions and team owners, courts found that concerted 
action to limit player compensation gave rise to antitrust concerns.  See supra note 
36.  Today, the fact that such restraints are an integral part of collective bargaining 
agreements between players and management shields them from antitrust scrutiny 
pursuant to the nonstatutory antitrust exemption. See supra note 36.  Unless and 
until NCAA players are recognized as employees who may decide to unionize and 
collectively bargain, no such exemption would apply to the NCAA-imposed 
restrictions on compensation.  NCAA schools collectively dominate the market as 
“purchasers” of top-level college football and basketball talent.  Players must 
comply with NCAA rules or not participate at the highest levels of intercollegiate 
sports.  Further, NCAA institutions may also be viewed as “sellers” of a unique 
combination of educational and coaching services.  See supra note 115.  The Second 
Amended Complaint in White alleged that the NCAA’s “artificial cap” on grants-
in-aid, set below the full cost of attendance, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
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continue to accept the idea that NCAA restrictions on athletes’ 
compensation are somehow noncommercial, the Board of 
Regents dichotomy will apply.  However, if courts begin to 
recognize that the academic ideal offered by the NCAA is more 
of a historical anachronism or a modern fiction, they will no 
longer be able to justify summary dismissal of student-athlete 
antitrust claims by simply relying on the dicta that athletes must 
not be paid.  Rather, these courts will be required to assess the 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of challenged 
restraints within well-defined markets.  In sum, the 
contemporary reality for at least some NCAA sports seems 
more consistent with the professional model than the archaic 
amateur standard. 
B.  The Propriety of Rule of Reason Analysis 
Assuming that courts will begin to repudiate any reflexive 
reliance on the Board of Regents bifurcated approach and more 
seriously analyze antitrust claims made by NCAA student-
athletes, questions arise regarding the proper method of 
substantive antitrust analysis.  Undoubtedly, the rule of reason 
rather than any per se rule of invalidity is the appropriate 
methodology because of the unique nature of league sports and 
the need for cooperation on rules of play and other matters.  
This approach requires antitrust plaintiffs to allege and prove 
anticompetitive effects within legally cognizable relevant 
markets.  If plaintiffs succeed in this endeavor, defendants then 
must offer procompetitive justifications for their actions.  The 
legality of the restraints in question ultimately will depend on 
their net competitive effects. 
Courts that have engaged in substantive antitrust analysis 
regarding NCAA regulations affecting student-athletes have not 
done a particularly satisfactory job of assessing either the 
anticompetitive consequences or the procompetitive impact of 
particular restraints.  Rather, courts often simply have assumed 
 
Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 3, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/eprise/main/administrator/ 
white_v_ncaa/6.pdf.  The complaint asserted that NCAA major college football and 
basketball are distinct product markets within which the NCAA wields market and 
monopoly power.  Id. at ¶¶ 39, 55, 74.  Absent the “cap,” the complaint alleged that 
student-athletes would receive “athletic scholarships that would, at a minimum, 
cover . . . true full costs of attendance.”  Id. at ¶ 67. 
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that NCAA restraints are needed to maintain a line of 
demarcation between amateur and professional sports or to 
promote and maintain competitive balance among competitors.  
A more detailed and careful analysis of these issues would be 
appropriate and more consistent with accepted antitrust 
principles. 
1.  Assessing Anticompetitive Effects 
First, courts must acknowledge that schools compete for 
student-athletes, and then assess the anticompetitive 
consequences of NCAA limits on compensation.  Commentators 
have recognized that the economic impact of the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules creates a wealth transfer from the players to 
their schools.122  Without the NCAA restrictions on payments to 
student-athletes, premier players might receive considerably 
more for their skills than the amounts prescribed by NCAA 
rules.  This might leave less money for coaches’ salaries or other 
expenditures, but it would be the predictable by-product of 
enhanced competition for the best athletes. 
Thus, the NCAA amateurism rules adversely affect 
competition in much the same way that the college television 
 
122 See, e.g., FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 29–30; RODNEY D. FORT, SPORTS 
ECONOMICS 494, 498–502 (2d ed. 2006); Lawrence M. Kahn, The Economics of 
College Sports:  Cartel Behavior vs. Amateurism 21 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, 
Discussion Paper No. 2186, June 2006), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp2186.pdf.  
Other commentators have noted that NCAA sports are big business generating 
substantial revenues.  See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 116, at 870 (the NCAA 
“reap[s] significant revenues from the players’ work product”); Goldman, supra 
note 116, at 206 (“Amateur athletics at the major college level is big business.”); 
Pekron, supra note 116, at 58 (“NCAA athletics are a moneymaking             
machine . . . .”); Schott, supra note 116, at 27 (college sports are “marketed, 
packaged and sold just like other commercial products”); Eric J. Sobocinski, College 
Athletes:  What Is Fair Compensation?, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 257, 270 (1996) 
(“[I]ntercollegiate athletic programs can potentially generate millions of dollars in 
revenue.”).  Professor (now Dean) Roberts noted: 
[D]espite the inherent difficulty of proving that antitrust goals are 
significantly harmed by the NCAA’s fixed “salary” system, the sensitivity 
of antitrust law to price and the basic assumptions underlying antitrust 
policy suggest that the mere fact of the wage fix is sufficient to establish the 
requisite anticompetitive harm in a prima facie rule of reason case.  While 
we cannot easily identify the manner and extent of the wealth transfers and 
resource misallocations, they surely are there. 
Roberts, supra note 116, at 2651.  See also United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 
1225 (7th Cir. 1993) (commenting in dicta that some might think the NCAA uses 
monopsony power to obtain athletic services below market price). 
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plan in Board of Regents and the restricted earnings rule in Law 
impaired the competitive process.  In each case, prices or wages 
are artificially distorted by concerted interference with the free 
play of competitive forces.  Although the NCAA and its 
constituent schools might argue that these restraints are 
reasonably necessary for the maintenance of amateur athletics in 
a competitively balanced league format, that argument should be 
part of the defendants’ case when attempting to argue that there 
are offsetting procompetitive justifications for anticompetitive 
conduct. 
2.  Consideration of Alleged Procompetitive Justifications 
The NCAA offers two principal justifications for the 
restrictions on payments to student-athletes:  (1) the need to 
maintain a clear line of demarcation between professional and 
amateur sports; and (2) the importance of preserving and 
promoting competitive balance in college athletics.  Indeed, if 
the NCAA rules regarding amateurism actually further these 
goals, they might withstand antitrust scrutiny despite their 
arguably obvious anticompetitive effect.  In Board of Regents, 
the Supreme Court recognized that the maintenance of 
competitive balance may be a valid procompetitive justification 
for NCAA action.  Also, efforts to keep amateur sports distinct 
from professional athletics plausibly are a procompetitive, 
output expansive means of providing consumers (sports fans) 
with a larger number of sports entertainment alternatives. 
However, the problem with these putative justifications for 
NCAA amateurism rules is that the facts arguably do not fit the 
theory.  Specifically, any allegedly clear line of demarcation 
between amateur and professional sports based on player 
compensation may be blurred much more in the modern 
intercollegiate sports context than in an ideal amateur model.  
Players already are being “paid” because of the economic value 
of the scholarships they receive in return for their athletic skills.  
These payments are not uniform because the value of an 
educational “free ride” apparently varies from school to school 
based on the wide disparity in tuition and other costs of higher 
education.  The key factor in the NCAA rules is that a “cap” is 
effectively placed on student-athlete remuneration.  This is 
arguably a quintessential example of a horizontal price restraint, 
albeit in the setting of league sports where some horizontal 
restraints are essential to create the finished product. 
2007] The NCAA in Its Second Century 359 
The foregoing casts doubt on the notion that consumers 
perceive or value intercollegiate sports as a qualitatively 
different product based on some artificial “compensation” 
distinction between professional and college athletes.  Both the 
professional and “amateur” are being paid, but the 
compensation for the professional is governed by a combination 
of collective bargaining and individual contract negotiation, 
while payments to college athletes are dictated and capped by 
NCAA members’ concerted action.  Further, even within the 
NCAA regime, illicit payments in violation of NCAA regulation 
have been uncovered repeatedly over the years.123  These 
violations of NCAA amateurism rules (cartel “cheating” to 
some) have not diminished student, faculty, or alumni support 
for successful college football or basketball teams.  On the 
contrary, many fans of perennial powerhouses in major college 
sports tolerate evasion or violation of NCAA rules, particularly 
if it translates into athletic success.  In short, the notion that 
consumers of college sports distinguish them from professional 
sports based on payments (or lack thereof) to the athletes is 
highly questionable.124  Any real distinction between 
professional and student-athletes should be predicated on 
keeping the “student” in the concept of the student-athlete.125 
The second oft-cited procompetitive justification for NCAA 
amateurism regulation is that paying student-athletes would 
adversely affect competitive balance.  The Board of Regents 
decision lends considerable credence to competitive balance as a 
legitimate NCAA objective.  However, there is reason to doubt 
 
123 See, e.g., FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 100–22; SACK & STAUROWSKY, 
supra note 7, at 35–40; SPERBER, supra note 118, at 264–74; WEISSBERG, supra note 
118, at 89; ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 45–46. 
124 See Edelman, supra note 116, at 871 (noting that “today’s amateurism includes 
a significant commercial component”); Pekron, supra note 116, at 54 (explaining 
that the NCAA system is really “semi-professional” and that “consumers of the 
NCAA product do not believe that the sport is amateur, and . . . often do not seem 
to want their teams to be amateur”); Roberts, supra note 116, at 2659 (suggesting 
that paying players would not dissuade college sports fans). 
125 It is worth considering whether supporters of college teams identify more with 
players who are also legitimate students.  The attempt to create a distinction 
between players who are merely “hired guns” and those who really function as 
students might be a more valid basis for drawing a line of demarcation between 
professional and student-athletes.  See infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text for 
a brief discussion of how the NCAA should enhance and maintain the 
professional/amateur distinction along academic rather than economic lines. 
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that the NCAA amateurism rules are reasonably necessary to 
promote competitive balance.  Instead, these regulations 
function more as cost control devices that simply shift wealth 
from players to coaches, universities, and others that reap 
economic rewards from the efforts of student-athletes.  As one 
commentator has explained: 
Clearly, the amateur requirement cannot enhance competitive 
balance.  The full tuition grant cap is higher at colleges with 
higher tuition.  Thus, those colleges have a talent recruiting 
advantage along this dimension.  The source of this recruiting 
advantage is that higher tuition typically signals higher quality 
of education and degree value.  Because the cap imposed by 
the NCAA amateur rules does not impose equal spending by 
all athletic departments (i.e., there is no minimum 
requirement), this cannot improve competitive balance.  
Finally, as with all caps, players make less than they would in a 
competitive system.126 
Further, as cases such as Board of Regents and Law have 
recognized, limiting only one type of spending or income does 
not significantly address the competitive balance issue.  
Spending lavish amounts on high-profile head coaches, building 
state-of-the-art stadiums and practice facilities, and providing 
other permitted inducements to athletes to attend particular 
institutions are not activities regulated in a manner designed to 
promote competitive balance.  In the same way that the NCAA’s 
plan for televising college football and its salary limits on 
assistant coaches failed to provide a sufficient procompetitive 
justification in Board of Regents and Law, respectively, the 
competitive balance rationale seems more pretextual than real 
when analyzed in the context of the NCAA amateurism rules.  
These regulations address only one part of the competitive 
balance issue and function more as a cost containment 
mechanism than an economically realistic and procompetitive 
method of fostering balanced competition. 
In sum, courts considering legal challenges to the NCAA 
amateurism rules have failed either to acknowledge that 
legitimate antitrust questions are raised or to properly apply the 
rule of reason pursuant to the Sherman Act.  Even when courts 
undertake antitrust analyses, they often fail to appreciate the 
existence of legally cognizable markets for the services of 
 
126 FORT, supra note 122, at 496; see also Roberts, supra note 116, at 2666–67 
(questioning whether NCAA rules foster competitive balance). 
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student-athletes and the anticompetitive consequences of 
NCAA regulation within these markets.  Courts also reflexively 
accept the idea that NCAA restrictions on compensation to 
student-athletes are necessary to maintain a clear line of 
demarcation between professional and amateur sports and to 
promote competitive balance.  This results in an unduly 
truncated and insufficient consideration of antitrust claims 
brought by NCAA student-athletes. 
IV 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
The current state of antitrust doctrine regarding NCAA 
amateurism rules appears to be inconsistent with the economic 
realities of contemporary intercollegiate athletics.  The 
distinction perceived by federal courts between NCAA 
regulation aimed at student-athletes and other forms of 
economic regulation reflects more of an anachronistic, historical 
ideal than the actual modern paradigm.127  College athletes, 
particularly in men’s elite Division I football and basketball 
programs, are the most important component in producing a 
highly valued and commercially viable product.  This suggests 
that current judicial approaches to the problem are inconsistent 
with American antitrust principles. 
 
127 As Judge Flaum noted: 
The NCAA would have us believe that intercollegiate athletic contests are 
about spirit, competition, camaraderie, sportsmanship, hard work (which 
they certainly are) . . . and nothing else. . . . It is consoling to buy into these 
myths, for they remind us of a more innocent era–an era where recruiting 
scandals were virtually unknown, where amateurism was more a reality 
than an ideal, and where post-season bowl games were named for 
commodities, not corporations. . . . [I]t is disquieting to think of college 
football as a business, of colleges as the purchasers of labor, and of athletes 
as the suppliers. 
 The NCAA continues to purvey, even in this case, an outmoded image 
of intercollegiate sports that no longer jibes with reality.  The times have 
changed.  College football is a terrific American institution that generates 
abundant nonpecuniary benefits for players and fans, but it is also a vast 
commercial venture that yields substantial profits for colleges . . . .  An 
athlete’s participation offers all of the rewards that attend vigorous 
competition in organized sport, but it is also labor, labor for which the 
athlete is recompensed. 
Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1098–99 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
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Several alternatives to the status quo should be considered.  
One possible solution is judicial reconsideration of the issues 
presented and the development of a more detailed and 
structured rule of reason analysis with respect to NCAA 
amateurism regulations.  A second approach would involve 
substantial policy reform within the NCAA to either amend or 
abolish some of the restraints that have been the subject of 
student-athlete antitrust suits.  Finally, in the absence of 
sufficient judicial or NCAA action to remedy the problem, 
Congress could design a legislative response. 
A.  A Change in Judicial Philosophy? 
Federal courts hearing antitrust challenges to NCAA 
rulemaking should consider more seriously the criticisms 
targeting current judicial approaches to NCAA amateurism 
rules.  Specifically, courts should recognize that their refusal to 
apply federal antitrust law to these disputes is inconsistent with 
the reality that NCAA student-athletes are engaged in a 
commercial endeavor both as students (consumers of 
educational services) and as athletes (sellers of sports talent).  
As such, their antitrust claims deserve to be adjudicated on the 
merits rather than summarily dismissed as beyond the scope of 
federal law. 
When considering the merits of these antitrust challenges, 
courts should apply the typical rule of reason analysis found in 
most Sherman Act litigation.  The plaintiffs should be required 
to allege and prove NCAA market power and anticompetitive 
effects within well-defined product and geographic markets.  For 
example, college football players could allege that compensation 
restraints restrict and distort competition within the market for 
Division I-A collegiate football players in the United States.  
Plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate that, in the absence 
of NCAA regulation, economic rewards would be more 
responsive to the forces of supply and demand.128  This would 
 
128 Of course, if a court felt that the anticompetitive effects were sufficiently 
obvious, it might decide to opt for the quick-look rule of reason used in cases like 
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016–19 (10th Cir. 19989).  As Law also recognizes, if 
a more traditional ruile of reason analysis is required, reasonableness under section 
1 of the Sherman Act will still be determined by the net impact of a restraint on 
competition.  Id. at 1016–17 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 695 (1978)); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770–71 
(1999).  Law views structured rule of reason analysis in terms of shifting burdens of 
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also require courts to acknowledge the existence of real 
economic markets in which schools actually compete for student-
athletes. 
Assuming plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrate the existence of 
anticompetitive effects within properly defined markets, a rule 
of reason approach should then afford the NCAA an 
opportunity to offer proof to offset plaintiffs’ evidence of 
competitive harm.  The rule of reason is dedicated to a 
determination of the net competitive impact of a challenged 
restraint, so the NCAA should certainly be permitted to 
demonstrate procompetitive justifications for its actions.  If the 
NCAA can demonstrate that procompetitive benefits ultimately 
outweigh any anticompetitive harm, the challenged restraint 
should be deemed reasonable and lawful under the Sherman 
Act.  Less restrictive alternatives also may be relevant in 
determining the reasonableness of a restraint. 
Courts generally have accepted, without any skepticism, the 
notion that NCAA amateurism rules promote competitive 
balance and maintain a necessary line of demarcation between 
professional and amateur sports.  On their face, these objectives 
seem to be procompetitive because they address concerns about 
consumer welfare.  Competitively balanced league sports result 
in a more desirable finished product for consumers, 
broadcasters, and advertisers.  The creation and maintenance of 
a distinct product (college sports) also seems to be consistent 
with the idea of creating more sports consumption alternatives 
and maximizing consumer satisfaction.  The problem, however, 
is that a judicial assumption or unsubstantiated conclusion that 
amateurism rules further these goals is no substitute for actual 
proof. 
In a rule of reason antitrust analysis, once anticompetitive 
effects are adduced, the burden is on defendants to prove that 
their actions actually further procompetitive goals.  Merely 
identifying the objective is inadequate; the defendants’ actions 
 
proof.  Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.  Plaintiffs must first prove anticompetitive effects, 
followed by defendants’ proof of procompetitive virtues.  Id.  Plaintiffs may then 
offer proof that substantially less restrictive alternatives exist or that the conduct is 
not reasonably necessary to achieve any legitimate end.  Id.  The goal is to 
determine whether, on balance, a restraint is reasonable.  Id.; see generally 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 259–60 (3d ed. 2005) (providing a “tentative 
road map” for identifying anticompetitive agreements among competitors). 
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must significantly promote valid economic results.  Thus, courts 
should require the NCAA to offer probative evidence that its 
amateurism rules actually address the competitive balance issue.  
The NCAA should shoulder the burden of demonstrating that 
relaxation or abolition of these regulations would impair or 
destroy the competitive balance required to present a high 
quality slate of games.  This proof is what the rule of reason 
requires, and the current case law is devoid of actual evidence in 
the record to support the competitive balance justification. 
In a similar vein, the simple assumption by courts that 
maintaining a line of demarcation between amateur and 
professional sports is essential and promoted by the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules is insufficient in a structured rule of reason 
analysis.  Rather than allowing the NCAA to justify its rules by 
its own ipse dixit, courts should require the NCAA to offer proof 
that the regulatory scheme does further the announced goal.  
Student-athletes already are compensated for their playing skills, 
but they are recompensed at fixed or capped levels.  Fans 
understand that the players they watch are receiving “payment” 
for their services, yet this does not seem to detract from support 
for the team.  If removing the restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation somehow will detract from consumer interest in 
college sports, that is something that the NCAA should be 
required to prove.  Judicial assumptions or the NCAA’s 
conclusory statements are not the equivalent of proof to support 
the alleged procompetitive justification. 
Finally, because NCAA regulation does occur within the 
context of the educational process, it may be that noneconomic 
goals should be considered.  Although Sherman Act rule of 
reason analysis usually is confined to economic effects, some 
authority suggests a broader analysis in the higher education 
context.129  If current NCAA rules expand athletic opportunities 
for male and female athletes in sports that insignificantly or 
negatively affect schools’ finances, courts might consider the 
expansion of athletic opportunity as a procompetitive 
 
129 In United States v. Brown University, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit decided that collective action by colleges and universities regarding 
distribution of financial aid should be considered under a full-blown rather than a 
quick-look rule of reason analysis, and noted that the district court should “more 
fully investigate the procompetitive and noneconomic justifications proffered by 
MIT.”  United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
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justification.  Once again, however, it should be incumbent on 
the NCAA to actually demonstrate the connection between its 
actions and any legitimate, procompetitive objectives. 
In sum, current judicial approaches to NCAA amateurism 
rulemaking are legally inadequate and ignore the realities of the 
marketplace.  Courts should undertake a more thorough, 
structured rule of reason analysis that ultimately puts the burden 
on the NCAA to demonstrate that its rules actually promote 
legitimate and lawful objectives.  If the NCAA’s regulatory 
scheme is reasonably necessary to promote legally cognizable 
procompetitive effects, its rules should be deemed valid.  If, 
however, the NCAA fails to carry the burden of proving 
sufficient procompetitive virtues, some or all of its amateurism 
rules may fail to withstand antitrust scrutiny.  If this occurs, 
schools may be free to make individual decisions regarding 
compensation and other benefits for their student-athletes.130  In 
either case, courts will scrutinize the actual anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects of a challenged restraint and not allow 
the NCAA to rely on outdated assumptions about intercollegiate 
athletics. 
B.  NCAA Regulatory Reform 
The NCAA itself could attempt to forestall judicial or 
legislative attacks on its existing regulatory scheme by engaging 
in serious policy reform.  After the NCAA departed from a 
regime limiting financial aid to student-athletes based on the 
same criteria applicable to other undergraduates, it essentially 
decided to pay players for their services–at fixed maximum 
levels of compensation.  It would not be a huge departure for the 
NCAA to acknowledge that athletes in Division I football and 
basketball often are “underpaid” compared to coaches and 
others who benefit from their efforts.131  As already noted, some 
 
130 Any decision by an educational institution receiving federal funds regarding 
student-athlete compensation would, of course, have to comply with the 
requirements of Title IX.  See infra note 133.  The current state of Title IX case law 
and regulation would make it difficult to compensate athletes in men’s revenue-
producing sports unless comparable compensation were offered to female athletes 
whose sports have a negative revenue impact.  This undoubtedly would complicate 
matters for any institution wishing to extend additional economic benefits to male 
football or basketball players in profitable programs. 
131 The “big business” aspects of NCAA sports prompted Bill Thomas, the 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to send a letter to Dr. Myles 
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commentators even suggest that these student-athletes are the 
functional equivalent of employees and should be given the 
same legal protection as other workers. 
The NCAA should consider allowing schools to pay stipends 
to student-athletes.  Many college players are from economically 
disadvantaged backgrounds and allowing payments of “walking 
around money” would seem both equitable and economically 
viable.132  Unless Title IX were changed, schools would be 
required to offer these benefits to both male and female student-
 
Brand, President of the NCAA, on October 2, 2006.  See Congress’ Letter to the 
NCAA, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2006-
10-05-congress-ncaa-tax-letter_x.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).  The letter posed a 
series of questions to determine, in part, whether the NCAA deserves to maintain 
its tax-exempt status.  Id.  Inquiries included:  (1) how does the NCAA accomplish 
its purpose of maintaining the athlete as an integral part of the student body?; (2) 
other than prohibiting compensation of student-athletes, how does the NCAA 
maintain a clear line of demarcation between major college athletics and 
professional sports?; (3) why should the federal government and taxpayers 
subsidize activities that pay for escalating coaches’ salaries, costly chartered travel 
and state-of-the-art athletic facilities?; and (4) are NCAA schools admitting athletes 
who could not be admitted without athletic prowess?  Id.  Many other questions 
also were posed regarding NCAA finances and its mission.  See id; see also Mark 
Alesia, Brand’s Salary on the Rise, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 28, 2007, at 1 (noting 
that the NCAA’s president received over $895,000 for 2005–06 and listing six-figure 
salaries of eight other NCAA employees); John R. Gerdy, For True Reform, 
Athletics Scholarships Must Go, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 12, 2006, at B6 
(arguing for the dismantling of the “professional model of college athletics” and the 
elimination of athletic scholarships); Brent Schrotenboer, NCAA’s Profits Get More 
Scrutiny, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 14, 2007, at D1 (noting that the NCAA 
men’s basketball tournament was expected to “pull in more than $500 million in 
television advertising revenue, “fueling” the eleven-year, six-billion-dollar 
television rights deal between CBS and the NCAA that began in 2003); Carol 
Slezak, NCAA States Obvious, Avoids Hard Questions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2006, at 95 (discussing commercialized nature of NCAA sports); Brad Wolverton, 
Congress Broadens an Investigation of College Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Sept. 22, 2006, at 36 (discussing Congressional interest in NCAA finances and 
business dealings). 
132 The stipend idea often has been discussed by commentators.  See, e.g., 
Edelman, supra note 116, at 884–85; Goplerud, supra note 116, at 1089–90; 
Christopher W. Haden, Chalk Talk, Foul!  The Exploitation of the Student-Athlete:  
Student-Athletes Deserve Compensation for Their Play in the College Athletic Arena, 
30 J.L. & EDUC. 673, 679–81 (2001); Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, 
Payment of Student-Athletes:  Legal & Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 55, 57–65 (2000); Schott, supra note 116, at 44; Sobocinski, supra note 122, at 
288 n.214.  Further, the NCAA has deregulated amateurism considerably for 
Division II and III by permitting some aspects of professionalism for student-
athletes, including acceptance of prize money, signing a professional contract, and 
entering a draft.  See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 281–82.  For a critical 
assessment of these changes, see generally Menzel, supra note 116. 
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athletes, and this arguably would temper the payment of 
exorbitant amounts of money.133  Of course, any effort by the 
NCAA to limit the amount of stipends could raise antitrust 
concerns as a maximum price or wage fix, but the NCAA might 
be in a better position than it is now given the complete bar on 
extra benefits.  Competitive balance arguments might be more 
plausible if higher compensation limits were implemented. 
Finally, if the NCAA really wishes to maintain a clear line of 
demarcation between amateur and professional sports, it should 
realize that such a distinction probably rests less on the question 
of compensation and more on emphasizing the “student” part of 
student-athlete.  To its credit, the NCAA has stepped up efforts 
to ensure that college players also participate in the academic 
aspects of the undergraduate experience.134  Of course, imposing 
initial academic eligibility requirements and monitoring the 
 
133 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006), prohibits sex discrimination in any education 
program or activity “receiving Federal financial assistance.”  This legislation was 
strengthened by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687–88 
(2006), which legislatively overruled case law limiting Title IX to situations where 
athletic departments directly received federal funds.  Current regulations 
promulgated by the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education to 
enforce Title IX are designed to promote equality in financial assistance.  See 34 
C.F.R. § 106.37 (2007) (discussing financial assistance); id. § 106.41(c) (addressing 
equal opportunity).  Section 106.37(a) specifically prohibits providing “different 
amounts or types of such assistance” based on sex, and section 106.37(c) requires 
that “reasonable opportunities” be made available for members of each sex to 
receive scholarships “in proportion to the number of students of each sex 
participating in [sports].” 
 Several commentators have acknowledged that paying student-athletes could 
create significant conflicts with Title IX principles.  See Edelman, supra note 116, at 
883 (noting “revenue sharing” between athletes and schools needs “careful 
tailoring” to comply with Title IX); Goplerud, supra note 116, at 1100 (explaining 
stipends would have to be offered to proportionate number of women athletes); 
Nygren, supra note 117, at 392–93 (noting that extending extra benefits to athletes 
in revenue-generation sports appears to violate Title IX); Parent, supra note 116, at 
239 (acknowledging burden of paying stipend to all student-athletes required by 
Title IX); Pekron, supra note 116, at 26 n.10 (noting “pay-for-play” scheme may 
face “serious problems” because of Title IX); Schott, supra note 116, at 49 (noting 
that limiting compensation to males in revenue-producing sports would be 
“impossible” under Title IX). 
134 See supra note 35.  These academic regulations include admissions standards 
that focus on performance in “core” high school courses as well as on the SAT or 
ACT exam.  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 29, § 14.3, at 140–47.  More recently, 
the NCAA also has adopted academic progress standards to monitor student-
athlete scholastic performance in college.  See id. § 14.4, at 147–54, §§ 23.01–23.4, at 
363–66; WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 35, at 771–72, 775–818. 
368 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 329 
academic progress of student-athletes only can work if adequate 
measures are in place to prevent academic fraud and other 
wrongdoing.  Further, if colleges and universities permit the 
proliferation of “Mickey Mouse” courses135 and the 
implementation of testing and grading procedures that provide 
for “social promotion,”136 NCAA academic reform will be 
ineffective. 
Still, college athletes are different from their professional 
counterparts because they are actually part of the student body; 
they need to be legitimate students.  News reports about athletes 
who have exhausted their eligibility but can barely read or write 
significantly detract from the student-athlete concept.  The 
failure of so many premier college athletes to earn degrees also 
erodes the professional/amateur distinction.137  NCAA efforts to 
focus on the academic aspects of the student-athlete concept are 
both laudable and less likely to create antitrust issues.138 
C.  Legislative Alternatives 
If the NCAA cannot resolve the problems presented by its 
regulation of student-athletes internally, and if the courts do not 
adequately address the problem, perhaps Congress will be the 
 
135 During a discussion on higher education expansion, Great Britain’s Higher 
Education Minister, Margaret Hodge, defined a “Mickey Mouse course” as “one 
where the content is perhaps not as rigorous as one would expect and where the 
degree itself may not have huge relevance in the labour market.”  ‘Irresponsible’ 
Hodge Under Fire, BBC NEWS, Jan. 14, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 
education/2655127.stm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
136 The term “social promotion” refers to “the practice of promoting a student 
from one grade level to the next on the basis of age rather than academic 
achievement.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005). 
137 See Editorial, Rutgers Too Quick to Pull Race Card on Professor, HOME 
NEWS TRIB., Sept. 28, 2007 (discussing remarks of Professor William C. Dowling on 
functional illiteracy of some student-athletes); Jon Solomon, Auburn Professor 
Alleges Fake Classes:  University Investigation Under Way, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, 
July 14, 2006, at 1E (mentioning illiterate former Auburn football player); Kurt 
Streeter, Using Their Brains, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at D1 (noting low graduation 
rates for some college football players, but better rates at Stanford). 
138 Such academic reform presents its own set of problems, including claims of 
racial discrimination.  See, e.g., Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 552 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1999).  This Article acknowledges 
the important concern that stricter academic requirements could result in exclusion 
of more minority student-athletes, but focuses primarily on the antitrust 
implications of the current NCAA regime. 
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last resort.139  The political cross-currents that so often 
accompany the legislative process suggest that the viability or 
desirability of this alternative might be criticized severely.  Yet, 
there is potential for Congress to be of some help, even if it is 
through hearings and the mere threat of legislative intervention. 
One possible legislative solution would be for Congress to 
create an antitrust exemption for the NCAA.140  An exemption 
could be limited to amateurism regulations, or it could be more 
extensive by treating the NCAA as a single economic entity and 
thereby removing much of its rulemaking from section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  This certainly would satisfy the NCAA and 
perhaps some of its membership.  However, this would also 
perpetuate the inequities that run rampant in the current system 
and make legal significantly anticompetitive conduct.  The 
easing of any burden on the judicial system could be outweighed 
by the negative impact of allowing the NCAA to continue to 
engage in an unsupervised distortion of market forces. 
A different legislative approach could require the payment of 
college athletes or granting them legal status as employees.  Of 
course, Congress also might have to consider what to do about 
possible conflicts with Title IX.  If all male and female athletes 
were given equal financial remuneration, Title IX would not be 
offended.  On the other hand, if Congress chose to provide relief 
 
139 For a discussion of possible legislative reform, see Parent, supra note 116, at 
234–36 (discussing possible legislative approaches); Jeff Barker, Congressman 
Thinks Colleges Should Pay Athletes, BALT. SUN, May 2, 2007, at 1E (discussing 
Congressman Rush’s desire to consider congressional action to deal with issue of 
paying college athletes). 
140 In 1992, in response to antitrust litigation surrounding the Ivy Overlap 
Agreement dealing with higher education financial aid, see, e.g., United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993), Congress enacted a temporary exemption 
allowing schools a limited degree of collaboration regarding financial aid practices, 
see Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 106 Stat. 448.  
Congress has renewed this exemption several times and it is scheduled to expire on 
September 30, 2008.  See Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-72, 115 Stat. 648.  The details of the exemption and its impact are addressed in a 
September 2006 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office to 
Congressional Committees.  See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-06-963, HIGHER EDUCATION:  SCHOOL’S USE OF THE ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY OR 
LIKELIHOOD OF STUDENT ENROLLMENT TO DATE 1–23 (Sept. 2006).  The 
rationale for this legislation was to promote equal access to education.  See id. at 1.  
Congress conceivably could consider a similar approach in the NCAA context to 
promote greater access to athletic opportunities for both men and women in sports 
with negative revenue. 
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only for revenue-generating sports like major men’s football and 
basketball (and perhaps women’s basketball), clear conflicts with 
Title IX would arise.  Congress would have to consider and 
balance the political, social, and economic costs and benefits of 
creating any limited exceptions to Title IX’s rigorous 
requirements.  Potential damage to athletic opportunities for 
female participants and the obvious economic inequality that 
would result might be deemed too deleterious.  On the other 
hand, perhaps the American public would be receptive to 
making exceptions based on real economic distinctions between 
revenue-producing college sports and others that fail to generate 
income. 
At the end of the day, a legislative solution may not be 
optimally practical or viable.  Rather, it is probably better for the 
NCAA to address these problems and for the courts to try and 
resolve these disputes on a case-by-case basis with a more 
enlightened and modern rule of reason approach. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of antitrust law relating to the NCAA and 
student-athletes is inconsistent with economic reality and sound 
policy.  Major college football and basketball players are 
essential components of a finished product that generates 
considerable revenue for schools and athletic conferences.  
Judicial failure to recognize that there is a market for the 
services of these athletes arguably may result in an unjustifiable 
restraint on competition and an illegal wealth transfer from 
student-athletes to their schools.  The student-athletes are 
economically injured as sellers of sports talent and as consumers 
of higher education.  Federal courts should apply the Sherman 
Act to the NCAA’s amateurism rules and engage in a structured 
rule of reason analysis that focuses on the facts rather than 
assumptions or mere conclusions.  More specifically, courts 
should assess the actual anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects of NCAA rules when challenged.  Courts should not 
merely assume or accept justifications for NCAA action without 
actual proof that legitimate goals are furthered by particular 
regulations. 
In addition, the NCAA should consider an internal solution, 
such as stipends or other forms of payment to athletes, as an 
alternative to the current compensation limits.  NCAA reform 
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may be the most efficient and desirable vehicle to transform the 
status quo into a system that is both equitable and consistent 
with American antitrust policy. 
Finally, in the absence of an effective judicial response or an 
NCAA change of heart, Congress should hold hearings to 
accumulate information from all interested parties.  After 
gathering sufficient data to understand the problems presented 
by existing NCAA rules and regulations, Congress should 
consider enacting legislation to create greater economic fairness 
for student-athletes.  Whether this takes the form of recognizing 
employment status for NCAA players, or whether Congress 
legislates in a manner that endorses pay-for-play, something 
must be done to prevent the continued economic exploitation of 
NCAA student-athletes.  The system is broken and in dire need 
of repair. 
 
 
